Bgp hijacking: massive internet storage in the fixed network of telecom

BGP hijacking: massive internet storage in the fixed network of telecom

For a clearly coarse number of landline connections of deutsche telekom, there are partly gross problems on thursday morrittag. The company itself now explained on twitter that services of microsoft are affected as well as webex of cisco. From the landline, the services could not be used, one already working on the correction. In some cases, a restart of the router will help, it will be built. Subjects have already answered that the tip has not helped.

For the problems, once again a case of BGP hijacking is now responsible. Providers IP address block as their own, which did not belong to them at all. As a result, the traffic directed to the addresses becomes the actual destination via the hijacker ("hijacker") redirected. In the current case, a bulgarian provider was probably responsible, as first analyzes nearby. That this is possible with little effort has been known for years and belongs to the rough security in the border gateway protocol, via the internet subnets of companies and providers connect to each other to the internet. Remedy against the laying of incorrect BGP routes was specified in the form of cryptographic hedge by RPKI, but the technique is already commonplace.